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PARTY-BASED CORRUPTION AND  
MCCUTCHEON V. FEC 
Michael S. Kang* 
Shaun McCutcheon contributed almost half a million dollars in 
campaign finance money over the last three years but wanted to contribute 
still more. In the 2011–2012 election cycle alone, he contributed to sixteen 
federal candidates, all three national Republican Party committees, and 
several other political action committees (PACs).1 Nonetheless, he wanted 
to contribute money to at least a dozen more candidates and even more to 
the Republican Party committees. The problem for McCutcheon is that the 
additional $100,000 that he wished to donate would have exceeded the 
federal aggregate contribution limit that capped the total amount an 
individual could contribute during that federal election cycle at $117,000.2 
In a case popularly billed as the next Citizens United,3 McCutcheon 
challenged this aggregate limit under the First Amendment,4 and if 
successful, he and other wealthy individuals will be free to donate almost 
$4 million in campaign finance contributions each election cycle. 
 
*
   Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Thanks to Guy Charles, Kay Levine, and 
Justin Levitt for comments on earlier drafts, and thanks to Steven Zuckerman for excellent research 
assistance. 
1
  See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D.D.C. 2012). Of course, all his contributions 
complied with the base contribution limits that cap the maximum contribution to a candidate and the 
maximum contribution to a political committee. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2012). 
2
  2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(B) (2012); Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure 
Limits and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 76 Fed. Reg. 8368, 8369–70 (Feb. 14, 2011). The 
aggregate limit is now set at $123,200 for the 2013–2014 federal election cycle, and comprises 
aggregate sublimits on contributions to candidates and contributions to political committees. One may 
not contribute an aggregate total of more than $48,600 to federal candidates, subject to the individual 
contribution limit of $2600 per candidate, during the 2013–2014 cycle, and no more than an aggregate 
total of $74,600 to other political committees. The latter aggregate total of $74,600 itself contains 
another sublimit of $48,600 in contributions to committees other than the national party committees. 
Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling 
Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 6, 2013); Press Release, FEC, FEC Announces 
2013–2014 Campaign Cycle Contribution Limits (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/ 
press/press2013/20133001_2013-14ContributionLimits.shtml. 
3
  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Again Weighs Spending Limits in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/politics/supreme-court-weighs-campaign-
contribution-limits.html; Trevor Potter, The Supreme Court Needs to Get Smarter About Politics, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-court-needs-to-get-
smarter-about-politics/2013/10/11/806c9c44-31b7-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html. 
4
  McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
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The irony in McCutcheon v. FEC is that the Supreme Court is likely to 
strike down all or a substantial part of the aggregate limit without 
considering a government interest that provides the strongest plausible case 
for the limit’s purpose. Ostensibly, all the litigants seem to agree that the 
government purpose for the aggregate limit is anti-circumvention of the 
base contribution limits. That is, the aggregate limit prevents an individual 
from circumventing the base limit on contributions to a particular candidate 
by barring the individual from donating large sums to other candidates or 
political committees who could then funnel those sums back to the original 
candidate. By capping the total amount an individual can contribute, the 
aggregate limit indirectly restricts the use of third-party conduits to fund a 
candidate beyond the base contribution limit. However, this rickety 
rationale does not capture the larger intuitive appeal of the aggregate limit, 
nor its most salient anti-corruption purpose. 
The bedrock of campaign finance regulation’s constitutionality is the 
government’s interest in the prevention of actual and apparent quid pro quo 
corruption. Traditionally, corruption has been understood as arising 
between a contributor and a candidate, with only a candidate positioned to 
offer quids in exchange for money by virtue of the candidate’s access to 
public office. But that myopic understanding of quid pro quo corruption as 
limited to individual candidates, each isolated from one another, makes 
little sense given the pervasiveness of political parties in national politics 
and campaign finance. The major parties today cannot be understood as 
separate from candidates and officeholders, but are constituted at their core 
by an alliance of candidates and officeholders who coordinate policymaking 
and campaign finance. The aggregate limit thus plausibly addresses the risk 
of quid pro quo corruption, not between the traditional dyad of high-level 
contributors and candidates, but between those contributors and political 
parties. 
Individual candidates and officeholders are hardly independent of each 
other in any important sense, and the risk of quid pro quo corruption is 
analytically little different for a cartel of candidates and officeholders than 
it is for individuals.5 The aggregate limit caps the total volume of campaign 
finance money that a high-level individual contributor can transact with a 
 
5
  Solicitor General Donald Verrilli captured this intuition, almost in passing, in the following 
description of party campaign finance during the McCutcheon oral argument: 
[E]very candidate in the party is going to be affected by [party campaign finance] because every 
candidate is going to get a slice of the money, and every candidate is going to know that this 
person who wrote the multimillion dollar check has helped, not only the candidate, but the whole 
team, and that creates a particular sense of indebtedness. 
And, of course, every member of the party . . . every officeholder in the party is likely to be leaned 
on by the party leadership to deliver legislation to the people who are buttering their bread. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–40, McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. argued Oct. 8, 2013) 
[hereinafter McCutcheon Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/12-536_21o2.pdf. 
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party or a party-based subgroup, much in the same way that base 
contribution limits cap the volume of money that the contributor can 
transact with a specific candidate. Understanding the aggregate limit 
through this lens as a structural check on party-based, group-level 
corruption better captures the corruption unease about an individual 
contributor donating close to $4 million per federal election cycle and better 
comports with the constitutional law of campaign finance regulation than 
the anti-circumvention interest that dominated the McCutcheon case. 
In truth, the type of group-level quid pro quo corruption that this Essay 
contemplates is less party corruption than party-based corruption. 
Substantive capture of an entire major party would be difficult given the 
sheer scale of the parties and multiplicity of interests they serve. However, 
the larger point is that politics is mediated pervasively by party linkages—
interconnecting individual candidates and officeholders—and these linkages 
belie an assumption that corruption is conceivable only at the level of the 
individual candidate. While the traditional notion of quid pro quo 
corruption imagines only the individual contributor–candidate dyad, 
candidates and officeholders publicly coordinate in party and subparty blocs 
on both campaign finance and lawmaking—both sides of the potential 
corruption ledger. 
Of course, this case for the constitutionality of the aggregate limit does 
not mean the limit is ideal public policy. We might not like its 
discouragement of contributions to candidates and parties vis-a-vis outside 
groups like Super PACs.6 We might prefer that the aggregate limit be set 
higher or lower based on what we estimate the risk of group-level 
corruption. As far as this Essay goes, such considerations are largely 
legislative matters for Congress to decide. The point is that the Court was 
not faced with the most intuitive case for the aggregate limit’s 
constitutionality. Even if the Court strikes down the aggregate limit in 
McCutcheon, supporters of new substitute reforms might consider 
advancing constitutional rationales based on the sort of group-level 
corruption concerns articulated here, particularly if and when the Court’s 
membership changes again.   
I. MCCUTCHEON AND ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION 
Federal law imposes an aggregate contribution limit on individual 
contributors in addition to the familiar recipient-specific limits. The 
recipient-specific contribution limits cap the amount that any individual 
may donate to a particular recipient—candidate, party, or other political 
committee—for a single election. The aggregate limit and associated 
sublimits are less known but cap the total amount that an individual may 
donate during a single election cycle collectively to all candidates. For the 
2013–2014 election cycle, the aggregate limit is $123,200, with no more 
 
6
 See infra note 42. 
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than $48,600 of that limit allocated to candidates and no more than $74,600 
allocated to political parties and other political committees.7 The 
constitutionality of this aggregate limit is the question at bar in McCutcheon 
v. FEC. 
The three-judge district court below upheld the aggregate limit based 
on an anti-circumvention theory.8 The court reasoned that the aggregate 
limit ensured that an individual could not indirectly contribute through a 
conduit more to a particular recipient than the recipient-specific base 
contribution limit permits.9 The court explained that a contributor could 
have made a $500,000 donation to a joint fundraising committee, which 
might have in turn transferred the full amount to a single party committee.10 
This half-million dollar donation would have exceeded the then-permissible 
$30,800 limit applicable to the federal party committees and $10,000 limit 
applicable to state and local party committees.11 This type of circumvention 
is frustrated by an aggregate limit that caps the amount that an individual 
could give any recipient, therefore confining the total amount of money that 
could be re-distributed down the line. 
The magic of this anti-circumvention theory, according to the limit’s 
supporters, is that it comports with the restrictive definition of corruption 
that emerged from Citizens United v. FEC.12 The decision in Citizens 
United struck down federal prohibitions on corporate electioneering based 
largely on its reasoning that only direct contributions from donor to 
recipient, or otherwise coordinated exchanges, produce the type of 
transaction that gives rise to a risk of quid pro quo corruption.13 Only the 
risk of quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance thereof, the Court seemed 
to indicate in Citizens United, permits the government to regulate campaign 
finance under the First Amendment.14 This conception of quid pro quo 
corruption connects with the anti-circumvention theory in McCutcheon. The 
anti-circumvention theory, consistent with Citizens United, envisions a 
dyadic relationship of potential corruption between a donor and recipient, 
which the government may regulate by limiting the amount of money that 
can be transferred between the two. While base contribution limits cap the 
amount a contributor can give directly to a single recipient, the aggregate 
limit constrains the amount a contributor might be able to give to the same 
recipient indirectly through other conduits. 
 
7
  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
8
  McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 138–42. 
9
  See id. at 140. 
10
  Id. 
11
  See id. 
12
  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
13
  See id. at 359–61. 
14
  See id. at 359. 
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However, at the threshold, the aggregate limit serves this purpose only 
by prohibiting any further federal candidate and party contributions, 
regardless of recipient. Of course, the aggregate limit prevents any money 
beyond the maximum amount from leaking back to candidates for whom a 
particular donor has already tapped the base limit. But the aggregate limit 
prevents the donor from giving to other recipients even when there seems 
no risk of circumvention. The cost of achieving anti-circumvention through 
the aggregate limit thus imposes some First Amendment costs. As Bob 
Bauer put it, “Most contributions are made specifically to someone or some 
entity, and the limit on contributions decreases the risk of corrupting that 
particular someone or entity[,] . . . [while] [t]he overall limit might seem 
more like a ceiling on spending.”15 It indiscriminately prevents 
contributions to candidates and parties beyond the aggregate maximum that 
otherwise would comply with the applicable base limits, at least for a small 
group of wealthy donors who otherwise would continue to give.16 The 
Center for Responsive Politics found 646 people in the 2012 federal 
election cycle who tapped the then-current aggregate limit of $117,000.17 
This group gave a total of $93.4 million directly to federal candidates and 
committees.18 In the absence of an aggregate limit, those donors each would 
be free to contribute more than $3.6 million to a major party’s committees 
and its candidates for a single election cycle by giving the maximum 
contributions to the party committees and every one of the party’s federal 
candidates.19  
Supporters of campaign finance regulation subtly touted suppression of 
campaign spending as a benefit of the aggregate limit, but the constitutional 
problem is that the bare purpose of capping aggregate spending by 
individuals extends beyond the conception of quid pro quo corruption 
articulated in Citizens United. The Court there framed quid pro quo 
corruption as essentially dyadic, between a particular donor and recipient.20 
The base limits address the risk of quid pro quo corruption inherent in a 
contribution by limiting the money involved. This makes sense because the 
potential for undue influence increases as the amount of money given to a 
particular recipient increases. However, the aggregate limit prohibits 
 
15
  Bob Bauer, The McCutcheon Case and the Contribution/Expenditure Limit Problem, MORE SOFT 
MONEY HARD L. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/04/contributions-and-
expenditures-in-campaign-finance-jurisprudence. 
16
  See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1917–18 
(2013) (providing examples of motivated billionaires who financed presidential campaigns with eight-
figure commitments). 
17
  Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS 
(Sept. 17, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-
why.html. 
18
  Id. 
19
  See Brief of the Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 6, 
McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. July 25, 2013). 
20
  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356–61 (2010). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E  
 245 
contributions to a recipient at the maximum not because the donor has 
already given a large amount to that recipient, but because the donor has 
given a large amount to other recipients. Under a dyadic conception of 
corruption, there is little logic in regulating the relationship between the 
donor and the recipient through an aggregate limit based on what that donor 
has transacted with other recipients outside that relationship. For instance, 
the aggregate limit allows a donor to make seventeen maximum candidate 
contributions, but does not quite allow an eighteenth that would put the 
donor over the limit. As Shaun McCutcheon himself argued, it is illogical to 
assume that the eighteenth candidate would be more likely to be corrupted 
by a $2600 contribution than the seventeenth candidate who just legally 
received the same amount.21 It is unclear why, under a dyadic conception of 
corruption, the earlier contributions under the aggregate limit are 
permissible, but the later ones that would violate the aggregate limit are not. 
Of course, the government’s position in McCutcheon is that, 
hypothetically, the donor’s eighteenth maximum contribution could wind its 
way back to the seventeenth recipient, in which case its prohibition does 
relate to the preceding contributions.22 However, as several Justices 
expressed during oral argument, this risk of circumvention seems uncertain 
and empirically unestablished.23 In the constitutional parlance, aggregate 
limits may not be sufficiently tailored to the government interest in anti-
circumvention. There are other more direct means of regulating 
circumvention through anti-earmarking and other types of prohibitions that 
are far from foolproof but lead to less costly overinclusiveness. 
II. PARTY CAMPAIGN FINANCE AT THE AGGREGATE LIMIT 
The aggregate contribution limit sits uneasily with the traditional 
candidate-based understanding of quid pro quo corruption, but a party-
based understanding of money’s influence in politics, grounded in the 
practice of modern campaign finance, helps clarify the plausible 
anticorruption purposes of the aggregate limit. Viewed through a party-
based understanding of campaign finance, the transacting counterparty for 
the type of wealthy donor affected by the limit may be one of the major 
parties or a party-based subgroup as a collective, rather than a particular 
candidate. 
The traditional dyadic conception of the relationship between 
contributor and candidate almost entirely leaves out the regular role of the 
major parties in campaign finance. It imagines quid pro quo corruption as a 
bilateral exchange between the contributor advancing private interest on 
 
21




  See Brief for the Appellee at 35–39, McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. July 18, 2013). 
23
  See, e.g., McCutcheon Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 35–42. 
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one hand and the candidate on the other hand. The salience of this scenario 
is exemplified in the corruption worry in Caperton v. Massey.24 There, the 
Court found a risk of actual bias from Don Blankenship’s $3 million in 
support of Brent Benjamin’s campaign for state supreme court justice.25 The 
Court focused on what just as well could have been an isolated quid pro quo 
exchange, actual or perceived, because the corruption worry in 
constitutional law is limited to just this sort of trade as its core concern. The 
Court never considered the larger partisan political context, nor would it 
have been important to the Court’s constitutional analysis, but the 
relationship between Blankenship and Benjamin was mediated by their 
common Republican Party ties. A long-time Republican operative running 
Benjamin’s campaign introduced the pair and helped orchestrate 
Blankenship’s spending in support of Benjamin.26 Blankenship not only 
funded Benjamin’s candidacy but also sponsored scores of Republican 
candidates as part of GOP legislative and electoral initiatives to win the 
state legislature.27 
In today’s high-level campaign finance, the major parties play an 
important brokering role in coordinating contributors and candidates. The 
major parties are pervasively involved in American electoral politics at 
virtually every level and branch of government. They nominate and help 
elect candidates to public office who will advance the party’s shared 
agenda. As part of that work, the major parties cultivate and maintain a 
deep infrastructure of professional fundraisers, campaign finance lawyers, 
and wealthy supporters who bring to bear modern campaign finance on 
behalf of the party’s candidates.28 The major parties match up campaign 
finance contributors with their candidates on an ongoing basis more 
efficiently and effectively than candidates could accomplish individually.29 
In my empirical work with Joanna Shepherd, we found that the influence of 
the major parties is so critical that judicial campaign finance is predictably 
associated with the preferred outcomes of contributors mainly in partisan 
elections where the parties play a role and little or not at all in nonpartisan 
elections.30 High-level campaign finance, particularly at the federal level 
where the aggregate limit applies, runs through the major parties. 
 
24
  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
25
  See id. at 2263. 
26
  See LAURENCE LEAMER, THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: A TRUE STORY OF GREED AND CORRUPTION 
211–13 (2013). 
27
  See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign 
Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1241–42 (2013). 
28
  See PETER L. FRANCIA ET AL., THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: INVESTORS, 
IDEOLOGUES, AND INTIMATES (2003); PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING 
AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON (5th ed. 2008). 
29
  See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 27, at 1241–42; Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The 
Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 109 (2011). 
30
  See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 27, at 1275–85; Kang & Shepherd, supra note 29, at 111–19. 
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The major parties aggressively court and cater to the type of dedicated 
high-level donor who hits the aggregate contribution limit. The political 
lives of contributors such as Don Blankenship and Shaun McCutcheon are 
tied up with their respective major party. The Republican National 
Committee itself is a co-plaintiff with McCutcheon in his lawsuit, and the 
very idea for the case appears to have been conceived at the 2012 
Conservative Political Action Conference, a Republican gathering in 
Washington, D.C.31 Like Blankenship, McCutcheon is a generous sponsor 
of the Republican Party and an involved leader in party affairs. He serves as 
the finance director and member of his county’s Republican Party executive 
committee, is the chairman of a party-allied Super PAC, and was the 
founding member of the Alabama GOP President’s Council, the top tier of a 
dozen highest donors to the Republican Party.32 As McCutcheon’s state 
party chairman explained, “[McCutcheon] wanted to make a difference, and 
do whatever it takes to help the party achieve its goal. . . . He never 
hesitated, whatever we asked him to do.”33 
The major parties have mastered the administrative process for 
receiving and distributing maximum contributions across many party 
recipients in compliance with the aggregate limit and sublimits. The parties 
have invested in the development of joint fundraising committees that ease 
the administrative challenge of legal compliance. These joint fundraising 
committees enable a sympathetic contributor to write a single check up to 
the aggregate limit, which the joint fundraising committee then distributes 
across individual candidates, party committees, and other PACs in 
compliance with all applicable limits.34 Thus the party can relieve the 
individual donor of almost all the transaction costs of broad party-based 
giving to dozens of party-related recipients. The joint fundraising 
committees associated with the major parties’ presidential candidates 
collected almost $1 billion together in 2012.35 
 
31
  Paul Blumenthal, Next Citizens United? McCutcheon Supreme Court Case Targets Campaign 
Contribution Limits, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/07/31/mccutcheon-supreme-court_n_3678555.html. 
32
  See Kim Chandler, Hoover Businessman at Center of U.S. Supreme Court Case on Contribution 
Limits, AL.COM (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/08/hoover_businessman_ 
at_center_o.html; Shaun McCutcheon, ALA. REPUBLICAN PARTY (May 23, 2012), 
http://algop.org/shaun-mccutcheon. 
33
  See Mary Orndorff Troyan, Alabama GOP Donor Challenges Limits, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/09/alabama-gop-donor-challenges-limits/ 
2634671 (quoting Alabama Republican Party Chairman Bill Armistead). 
34
  See Paul Blumenthal, McCutcheon v. FEC’s Other Threat: Case Could Super-Size Joint 
Fundraising Committees, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/10/07/mccutcheon-joint-fundraising-committees_n_4057547.html. 
35
  See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Joint Fundraising Committees, OPENSECRETS, http://www. 
opensecrets.org/pres12/jfc.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
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It is precisely the party-based organization of campaign finance at the 
highest level of giving that worries reformers about the demise of the 
aggregate limit. The partisan invention of the joint fundraising committees, 
coupled with high-level donors sympathetic to party centralization of 
campaign finance, raises the prospect of individual donors giving up to $3.6 
million per federal election cycle in the absence of an aggregate limit.36 This 
party-centered character of campaign finance at the aggregate limit explains 
why the briefing and advocacy regarding McCutcheon assumes without 
explanation that the maximum a high-level donor would contribute, in the 
absence of an aggregate limit, is $3.6 million. The calculation of the figure 
includes maximum contributions for all federal candidates of one major 
party along with maximum contributions to that party’s national and state 
committees. Of course, if a high-level donor was inclined to do so, she 
could double the $3.6 million figure by giving equally to both major parties, 
but no one imagines that a high-level donor would contribute at such levels 
to both.  
Indeed, high-level contributors at the aggregate limit overwhelmingly 
tend to be coupled faithfully to one of the major parties. The Sunlight 
Foundation looked at the top 1000 donors for the 2012 federal election, all 
of whom gave at least $134,300, and found that only thirty-three of the top 
1000 split their money roughly evenly between the major parties.37 In fact, 
886 of the 1000 gave at least 90% of their contributions to one party, and 
744 gave all their contributions to one party.38 Among contributors who hit 
the aggregate sublimit for national party committees, nearly all gave 90% or 
more of their party contributions to one major party.39 What’s more, the 
major parties appear heavily reliant on these high-level donors. The 
Republican national committees, for instance, took in a third to half of their 
2012 contributions from the top 0.01% of the U.S. population who 
contributed the most federal campaign money.40 
 
36
  See Scott Lemieux, McCutcheon, the Next Victory for the 1 Percent, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 9, 
2013), http://prospect.org/article/mccutcheon-next-victory-1-percent. 
37
  Lee Drutman, The 1000 Donors Most Likely to Benefit from McCutcheon—and What They Are 
Most Likely to Do, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/ 
blog/2013/10/02/top1000donors. 
38
  Id. 
39
  See Michael Beckel, Supreme Court ‘McCutcheon’ Case Could Aid GOP, CTR. FOR PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY (Oct. 7, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/10/07/13510/supreme-court-
mccutcheon-case-could-aid-gop (citing a finding by the Center for Responsive Politics that just 2% of 
contributors capped by the party aggregate sublimit donated money to a combination of national 
committees representing each party). What is more, seventeen of the top twenty political donors during 
the first three quarters in 2013 gave exclusively to one party, and all the top twenty donors gave at least 
95% of their donations to only one party. Ctr. for Responsive Politics & Sunlight Found., Most Likely to 




  See Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (June 24, 2013, 
9:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E  
 249 
Without an aggregate limit, the parties’ joint fundraising committees 
could conceivably enable individual donors to write one seven-figure check 
for their respective party, instead of undertaking the prohibitively difficult 
exercise of distributing millions in individual contributions, subject to base 
limits, across hundreds of candidates and committees. The major parties, 
through their general administrative capacity, enable individual donors to 
overcome the practical challenges of campaign finance and maximize the 
partisan advantage from their generosity. 
III. PARTY-BASED CORRUPTION 
The party-centered practice of campaign finance at, or prospectively 
beyond, the aggregate limit raises a concern about a slightly different form 
of quid pro quo corruption than the usual dyadic conception of corruption 
with a particular candidate. High-level donors at the aggregate limit may 
effectively transact with the party itself, or at least an important subparty 
group, as much as they do with any individual candidate or official. These 
donors intend to support the party’s broader efforts beyond any particular 
person, and the party cultivates these donors as long-term sponsors of the 
party’s or subparty group’s agenda across many campaigns, elections, and 
candidates. Joint fundraising and party committees represent the parties 
concretely in campaign finance as identifiable legal entities, but a major 
party extends beyond its legal entities. It coordinates electoral and 
legislative action along myriad political lines that encompass and transcend 
those legal entities. Contributors and candidates are likely to be connected 
by a major party that manages its relationship with important contributors 
and can carefully track and account for the contributors’ generosity and 
political interests. As a result, high-level donors who bump up against the 
aggregate limit obtain access to party actors’ attention and agendas at the 
highest level. 
The aggregate limit thus serves a sort of base contribution limit to 
party-based giving by these high-level donors. If one forgets the role of the 
major parties in campaign finance, it is easy to question why a $2600 
contribution limit to one candidate is more corrupting when it follows 
similar contributions to other candidates. From a dyadic conception of quid 
pro quo corruption at the candidate level, one contribution appears 
unrelated to subsequent ones to different recipients. But in high-level 
campaign finance among contributors capped by the aggregate limits, 
maximum contributions across many recipients often are highly related. An 
individual contributor may not even know all the candidates to whom she 
has contributed, perhaps through a joint fundraising committee or other 
party-related mechanism, but she is likely to believe that the contributions 
advance the party’s cause and are recognized by those who run the party 
across its many manifestations. The aggregate limit therefore caps this 
maximum amount that an individual contributor can donate to the party’s 
cause per election cycle and addresses the most extreme worries about the 
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contributor’s influence with the party as a result of campaign finance 
considerations.41 
Once the major parties, or at least cognizable subparty groups, are 
identified as a transacting counter-party to high-level contributors, the 
aggregate limit’s anti-corruption purpose makes far greater sense. Although 
a particular candidate may not feel directly indebted to a contributor based 
on contributions to other candidates, even a major party is likely to be 
indebted and reliant on a contributor who can donate $3.6 million per 
election cycle to the party, its committees, and its candidates.42 The 
aggregate limit and sublimits suppress any corruptive potential for high-
level campaign finance at a collective party-based level analogous to the 
way that base contribution limits suppress the corruptive potential of an 
individual contribution at the candidate level. The aggregate limit and 
sublimits recognize that the corruptive potential of a campaign contribution 
increases with the magnitude of the dollars involved, and therefore bound 
that magnitude for the relevant contributor-recipient dyad. 
The risk of quid pro quo transactions at the collective party-based level 
is not too difficult to imagine. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court in McConnell v. 
FEC essentially adopted the view that “[t]he idea that large contributions to 
a national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of 
corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor 
implausible.”43 In upholding a prohibition on soft money contributions to 
the national party committees, the Court recognized the “special 
relationship and unity of interest” between the party and its candidates such 
that contributions to the party effectively bought access and influence over 
party candidates.44 Although the Roberts Court has distanced itself from this 
earlier reasoning,45 the analysis in McConnell and other decisions actually 




  An obvious result of striking down the aggregate limit would be an increase in fundraising by 
candidates and party committees, because at least some high-level donors would contribute more in the 
limit’s absence. A portion of this increase would likely be money redirected from Super PACs and other 
unconnected committees as a result of a reverse hydraulic redirection of funds in response to 
deregulation. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 41–43 
(2012). A shift of money away from independent groups, like Super PACs and other unconnected 
committees, may be normatively beneficial, as I have suggested in earlier work. See id. at 47–52. 
However, for this Essay I focus on the separate question of whether there is a constitutional ground for 
the aggregate limit. 
42
  See Justin Levitt, Symposium: Aggregate Limits and the Fight over Frame, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 
16, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-aggregate-limits-and-the-fight-
over-frame (“It’s not hard to imagine leaders’ incentive to give special legislative favors for donors 
willing to give maximal support to all of the party’s candidates.”). 
43
  540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003). 
44
  See id. at 145. 
45
  See Kang, supra note 41, at 23–25. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E  
 251 
First, in its campaign finance cases, the Court has traditionally viewed 
the major parties formalistically as separate from their candidates and 
officeholders. The Court has conceptualized the parties as close but separate 
partners of their candidates and officeholders, rather than, as they are, 
composed of and led by their candidates and officeholders. Even as the 
Court in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee 
worried about the role of parties as “a funnel from donors to candidates,” 
serving as pass-through conduits for money from individuals to 
candidates,46 the Court nonetheless earlier in the same litigation rejected the 
notion that “the party, in a sense ‘is’ its candidates.”47 The Court ruled, for 
instance, that the party committees’ independent expenditures on behalf of 
their candidates should be understood as independent from their candidates 
“no less than . . . the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or 
other political committees.”48 The Court’s formal view of parties as separate 
from candidates and officeholders is attributable in part to the fact that the 
framing of the cases demanded distinction between the national party 
committees’ accounts and candidate accounts as legally, if not politically, 
defined entities. However, these party committees were centrally composed 
of and led by candidates and officeholders from their respective parties, as 
they always are. A conceptualization of formal party entities as removed 
and independent from the control of their candidates and officeholders, at 
least in high-level campaign finance, is difficult to maintain. At their heart, 
the parties are their candidates and officeholders. 
Second, flowing from the understanding of the national parties as 
separate from candidates and officeholders, the Court has understood the 
risk of corruption in party campaign finance as mainly one of access and 
circumvention. In Colorado II, the Court upheld restrictions on the relevant 
party committees there as necessary to prevent the “circumventing [of] 
contribution and coordinated spending limits binding on other political 
players.”49 In McConnell, the Court upheld party restrictions to prevent the 
“national party committees [from] peddling access to federal candidates and 
officeholders . . . .”50 Of course, as mere conduits or support groups for 
candidates and officeholders, the parties could do little more than serve as 
pass-through conduits for money, or with the benefit of more agency, sell 
access by virtue of their special association with their candidates and 
officeholders. What a party cannot do, at least when understood as distinct 
from its candidates and officeholders, is directly engage in the type of quid 
pro quo exchange that the Roberts Court takes as the core concern of 
campaign finance law. A party itself, under this view, wields no 
 
46
  FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 461 (2001). 
47
  Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado I), 518 U.S. 604, 622 (1996). 
48
  Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 444 (quoting Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616). 
49
  See id. at 455. 
50
  See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003). 
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government authority to sell off. For this reason, the Court’s analysis of the 
government’s interest in party-based campaign finance regulation has been 
limited to concerns about access to candidates and officeholders, or about 
circumvention of campaign finance limits on candidates and officeholders. 
As a result of this understanding, the Court has thus far posited that 
parties sell and trade only access, not lawmaking authority itself. However, 
if political science teaches us anything about modern politics, it is that 
officeholders organize themselves into and lead political parties, and that 
these parties matter in lawmaking.51 The party enables these sufficiently 
like-minded officeholders to act in concert and coordinate their legislative 
activity to their mutual benefit. Every party member knows that each vote 
or other action dictated by the member’s party will not necessarily offer a 
positive individual payoff, but every member also bets that he or she will 
benefit over the long run across a full accounting of party votes and 
actions.52 In this context, parties are inextricably connected to candidates 
and officeholders. These officeholders that constitute the core of the parties 
do wield lawmaking authority, and hard-money contributions to the parties 
they control and constitute may pose a similar worry of actual or apparent 
quid pro quo corruption as contributions to candidates and officeholders 
themselves. 
The parties are therefore composed at their core of a cartel of allied 
lawmakers who can leverage their collective action and economies of scale 
in campaign finance. Together these lawmakers develop a campaign finance 
apparatus and share major contributors. In this effort, they care not simply 
whether they individually receive any particular contribution, but whether a 
contribution, wherever it is formally received, benefits the coordinated 
party effort of which they are an important part. Again, party lawmakers 
know, in the spirit of mutual benefit, that every contribution and 
expenditure may not advance the lawmaker’s individual interest, but over 
the entirety of activity, they should benefit both individually over the long 
run and collectively from the party’s advancement.53 A party-based view of 
the aggregate limit best captures the intuition that allowing an individual to 
 
51
  See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995) (explaining the essential functions of political parties in 
American politics). 
52
  See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY 
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2d ed. 2007) (describing parties as just such legislative cartels); ALDRICH, 
supra note 51 (same). 
53
  There is significant pooling of campaign finance money among candidates and parties. Not only 
does much of party spending benefit individual candidates, but most congressional officeholders 
contribute money to their party committees. For instance, among congresspeople in 2012, 170 of 193 
Democrats in the House donated to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee for a total of 
$25.5 million, while 211 of 242 House Republicans donated to the National Republican Congressional 
Committee for a total of $44.6 million. Russ Choma, Supreme Court and Campaign Finance: 
McCutcheon Chapter, OPENSECRETS (Oct. 8, 2013, 9:16 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/ 
2013/10/supreme-court-and-campaign-finance-mccutcheon-chapter.html. 
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contribute close to $4 million in contributions per election cycle might buy 
something more than the sum of all the individual $2600 and $5000 
contributions. 
As an analytical matter, the risk of corruption is not very different at 
the group level from the individual level. What can be exchanged between 
two individuals—contributor and candidate—can be exchanged between a 
contributor and a group of candidates as well. To illustrate, imagine a club 
of lawmakers that decides to sell their votes as a bloc, which increases their 
value. The club aggregates certain contributions and shares significant 
money to the benefit of the club members, then agrees to vote together as a 
group as the club dictates. In this case, members should not care whether 
the money is deposited dyadically from contributors to their individual 
account, nor will they limit their responsiveness to those contributors who 
deposited only in their account. Members will care less where the money 
goes if they are secure that the club will pool the money and spend it to 
their mutual benefit.54 This arrangement to sell votes certainly would 
constitute quid pro quo corruption, and indeed it is sometimes how actual 
corruption works.55 The reform worry is that a similar type of coordination, 
albeit less explicit, can take place at the party level if campaign finance law 
provides the incentive, in the absence of an aggregate limit, of $3.6 million 
in contributions from a single individual per election cycle. 
This depiction overstates the collectivization of campaign finance 
through the parties, but far less so with respect to how party fellowship may 
play out for high-level contributors freed from the aggregate limit. Without 
a doubt, officeholders and candidates rationally prioritize their personal 
fundraising that they control exclusively and differentiate between their 
campaign funds and those of even their dearest, most trusted party allies. 
But their interest in assisting party allies becomes far more salient with 
respect to high-level contributors near the aggregate limit, who have already 
maxed out base contributions directly to them. Specifically, such party 
officeholders and candidates can receive no more money directly from 
those contributors but can benefit further if their contributors are willing to 
invest additional money in their favored party colleagues and institutions.56 
Once the most generous supporters have maxed out their direct 
contributions to party leaders and candidates, those leaders and candidates 
are more than happy to have their supporters give even more money 
 
54
  See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 453 (“In other words, the party is efficient in generating large sums 
to spend and in pinpointing effective ways to spend them.”). 
55
  See, e.g., Eliza P. Nagel, Note, For the People or Despite the People: The Threat of 
Corporations’ Growing Power Through Citizens United and the Demise of the Honest Services Law, 
63 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 741–49 (2011) (discussing the Corrupt Bastards Club and United States v. 
Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)). 
56
  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 125 (2003) (describing how candidates directed 
maxed-out contributors to donate money to their respective national party committees and other 
organizations aligned with their party). 
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through separate contributions to party committees and fellow candidates. 
The aggregate limit arguably targets the ability of only a few hundred very 
high-level contributors who can transact in this way at the wholesale level. 
Obviously, there are other differences between party-based quid pro 
quo and the corruption worry at the level of individual candidates. Party-
based quid pro quo corruption implicates no less of the well-recognized 
theoretical complications for candidate corruption,57 and actually even 
more. At least in theory, an individual candidate may be so reliant on the 
sponsorship of one contributor—as the Court seemed to think about Justice 
Benjamin’s relationship with Don Blankenship in Caperton—that the risk 
of actual or apparent corruption is particularly acute. By contrast, a major 
party aggregates a far greater diversity of interests and constituents, which 
limits the influence of any specific individual no matter how much money 
the individual devotes to the party. Parties by definition are broader, larger 
enterprises than individual candidacies, with a deeper contributor base 
within which any individual contributor is more likely to be subsumed. It is 
harder to corrupt even an important subparty group than an individual 
candidate, both in actuality and appearance. 
Party-based quid pro quo corruption also presents greater problems of 
proof. Inference of a causal relationship between campaign finance 
contributions and legislative activity by an individual candidate is always 
difficult. It is even more difficult to infer corruption for a group of allied 
candidates. The relationship between the aggregation of money across many 
candidates and party committees and the legislative behavior of a large 
group of officeholders is difficult to sort out when the quid pro quo 
exchanges, at least in theory, occur on an unindividuated basis with many 
players.   
Nonetheless, these complications with group-level corruption raise 
matters for regulatory calibration rather than rendering regulation 
categorically unconstitutional. Although group-level corruption is as 
plausible in theory as individual-level corruption, it is harder to achieve 
across multiple candidates in practice and justifies this lighter regulatory 
touch as a result. For this reason, the aggregate limit must be set at a very 
high dollar ceiling to affect only those contributors whose donations would 
be large enough to motivate their recipients into overcoming the collective 
action challenges of group-level corruption. In other words, group-level 
corruption is admittedly less likely in practice than individual-level 
corruption dollar-for-dollar and demands a much higher threshold before 
regulation. But this adjustment speaks to regulatory calibration, not the 
theoretical justifiability of any regulation at all. And it deserves mention 
 
57
  See generally Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996) (challenging the empirical and normative 
premises of campaign finance reform); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997) (outlining inconsistencies in the conception of quid pro quo 
corruption). 
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that group-level corruption presents potentially far higher payoffs for the 
contributor when it is achieved. A group of candidates and officeholders 
can offer more attractive quids than they can individually, and thus the 
regulatory calibration should offset any improbability by the greater 
potential value of group-level corruption. 
Of course, it goes way too far to argue that parties are little more than 
structures for such coordination between officeholders and their 
contributors, and that is not at all my claim. As I have argued previously, 
parties are immensely valuable institutions that organize and advance the 
ideological policy commitments of their various constituents, from 
officeholders at the top to average voters at the bottom.58 However, the 
aggregate limit plausibly suppresses the ability of party-based groups to 
engage in actual and apparent quid pro quo exchanges with the few 
contributors who have the means and potential interest in these transactions. 
Not many individuals wish to donate almost $4 million for a federal 
election cycle, but the aggregate limit restricts the ability of contributors to 
wield that sort of leverage through the major parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Defenders of the aggregate limit style it, consistent with what they 
view as the demands of First Amendment law, as a check against 
circumvention of base contribution limits. Along these lines, at oral 
argument in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts sought a solution that 
served the same anti-circumvention goal without also preventing a 
contributor from contributing to as many candidates as desired.59 He seemed 
to contemplate the possibility of striking down the aggregate sublimit on 
candidate contributions while upholding the aggregate sublimits on party 
committees and other PACs. If party committees and other PACs are the 
most likely conduits for circumvention, then a contributor might struggle to 
circumvent the base limits but still remain free to support all the candidates 
the contributor wants to support. 
A problem with this tailored judicial response is that it might not 
realistically address the risk of party-based, group-level corruption. Anti-
circumvention is only one plausible goal of the aggregate limit and too 
narrowly frames the only relevant relationship in campaign finance as 
between the contributor and a single candidate. It fails to account for the 
fact that, at least at the federal level, nearly every candidate and high-level 
contributor operates within a highly partisan campaign finance ecosystem 
within which the major parties matter a great deal. A high-level 
contributor—who contributes heavily to one party and its candidates at the 
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  See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131 
(2005). 
59
  See McCutcheon Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 14–15, 29–30, 47–48. 
108:240 (2014) Party-Based Corruption and McCutcheon v. FEC 
 256 
aggregate limit, and beyond it in its absence—effectively may transact not 
only with individual candidates, but with their party and party-based allies. 
Both the aggregate limit and base contribution limits plausibly address the 
risk of corruption by limiting the maximum amount involved in the 





  This Essay argues that the aggregate limit is best understood practically as a party-based 
contribution limit, but a useful legislative amendment would be to make the aggregate limit more 
explicitly a party-based one by capping not simply the total amount contributed, but the total amount 
contributed to a single party’s candidates and committees. Such a party-based aggregate limit would 
allow further contributions to other parties’ candidates and committees, and as a result, allow a greater 
degree of individual spending and discretion while serving the same purpose. Thanks to Nathan Brenner 
for this suggestion. 
